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NOTWITHSTANDING THE CURRENT POLITICALCLIMATE’S preoccupation with terrorism,
the economy, and corporate scandals, the eso-
teric and seemingly impenetrable subject of
campaign finance reform has remarkably
found its way upon the political agenda. Con-
gress has debated and passed a campaign fi-
nance reform statute, which, as is the destiny
of all important public policy questions, is cur-
rently wending its way to the Supreme Court
for that body’s constitutional wisdom. Thus, it
appears as if campaign finance issues will be
with us for a long time to come. As such, Pro-
fessors Ackerman and Ayres’s thoughtful and
provocative book, Voting with Dollars: A New
Paradigm for Campaign Finance,1 is certainly
timely and relevant. Moreover, Voting with Dol-
lars is easy to read, the chapters are relatively
short, and the ideas are presented lucidly and
argued persuasively.2 It is also written in a style
that does not eschew technical concepts but
avoids arcane language. The resulting product
is a book that remarkably speaks to policy-
makers (to whom the book seems to have been
primarily directed), academics, practitioners,
and all relatively informed readers.3
The book merges two ideas previously pre-
sented separately by the authors—a twist on
public funding by Ackerman4 and anonymity
in campaign contributions by Ayres.5 The par-
adigm shift referenced in the book’s title is the
conception that campaign contributions are
akin to voting. According to the authors, some
of the rules that apply to the franchise, specif-
ically equality and anonymity, should also ap-
ply to campaign finance. Voting with Dollars is
quite persuasive and particularly so when the
authors’ arguments are taken on their own
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1 BRUCE ACKERMAN & IAN AYRES, VOTING WITH DOLLARS: A
NEW PARADIGM FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE (2002).
2 For example, professors wishing to assign part of the
book have the option of assigning chapter 1, which is less
than twelve pages but presents an informative thumbnail
sketch of the Ackerman-Ayres paradigm.
3 In contrast to most legal academic writing, the authors
have given serious thought to the feasibility of their pro-
posal. Voting with Dollars includes a model statute and
numerous appendices intended to demonstrate the ease
with which Voting with Dollars may be readily imple-
mented.
4 Bruce Ackerman, Crediting the Voters: A New Beginning
for Campaign Finance, 13 AM. PROSPECT 71 (1993). For other
prominent voucher-based proposals see Richard L.
Hasen, Clipping Coupons for Democracy: An Egalitarian/Pub-
lic Choice Defense of Campaign Finance Vouchers, 84 CAL. L.
REV. 1 (1996); Edward B. Foley, Equal-Dollars-Per-Voter: A
Constitutional Principle of Campaign Finance, 94 COLUM. L.
REV. 1204 (1994).
5 Ian Ayres & Jeremy Bulow, The Donation Booth: Man-
dating Donor Anonymity to Disrupt the Market for Political
Influence, 50 STAN. L. REV. 857 (1998).
terms. But Voting with Dollars also raises some
unanswered questions.
The first part of this review lays out the au-
thors’ basic framework. The remainder of the
review addresses some of the very interesting
and thought-provoking issues that the book
raises. The second part inquires whether the
campaign-financing scheme preferred by Vot-
ing with Dollars is sufficient to adequately 
finance federal campaigns. The third part ex-
amines whether Voting with Dollars has con-
vincingly identified the problem in campaign
finance that necessitates reforming. Part Four
offers some preliminary thoughts on political
equality in campaign finance.
THE NEW PARADIGM
Voting with Dollars offers one overarching
theme with two distinctive contributions. First,
the book provides the “democratic tradition cen-
tered on the franchise” as the guiding paradigm
for campaign finance reform.6 The authors argue
that traditional campaign finance reformers have
treated democratic politics as if they were regu-
lating the economy. Consequently, the reformers
have responded to problems in campaign fi-
nance by employing one of three methods: com-
mand and control regulation; bureaucratic sub-
sidies; or complete disclosure. As they note,
“[w]henever a policy wonk confronts the widget
market, it is second nature to ask whether wid-
gets generate harms to third parties that require
command and control regulation, whether wid-
get producers need subsidizing to achieve opti-
mal levels of production, and whether widget
consumers require better information to make in-
formed choices.”7 They conclude that these pre-
ferred reform methods are “part of the problem,
not part of the solution.”8
According to Voting with Dollars, the proper
foundation for resolving campaign finance
problems begins with the understanding that
donating money to a campaign is a form of po-
litical participation akin to voting. Indeed, the
authors note, campaign contributions perform
the same legitimating function as elections:
If the deliberations of democratic citizens
are crucial in the legitimation of market
inequality, we cannot allow market in-
equalities to have an overwhelming im-
pact on these deliberations. If this hap-
pens, we can no longer say that we, as
citizens, have authorized the pervasive in-
equalities we experience as market actors.
Politics will have been transformed into a
forum in which big money praises itself.9
Thus, “[e]ven when our votes count equally, in-
equality of private wealth may distort public
deliberation in ways that are inconsistent with
our mutual recognition as equal citizens.”10 In
addition, the consequence of “malcontribu-
tions”11 in electoral campaigns is that political
actors are less responsive to the populace as a
whole and more responsive to large contribu-
tors.12
From the lessons provided by voting as the
center of the new paradigm, the authors derive
two important animating principles that con-
stitute the two distinctive contributions as well
as the core of the new paradigm: equality and
anonymity.13 For Voting with Dollars, the rela-
tionship between equality in voting—one per-
son, one vote—and equality in campaign fi-
nance is fairly straightforward. Equality in the
distribution of the franchise is a foundational
component of a democratic polity. “Citizens
are given equal voting power”14 and each “cit-
izen expects his ballot to have equal weight” in
an election.15 If equality is such an important
concern with respect to the franchise, why not
extend the principle to campaign contribu-
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6 ACKERMAN AND AYRES, supra note 1, at 4.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id. at 13; see also id. at 73 (“The more big money shapes
the direction of American politics, the less democratic pol-
itics can serve as a primary legitimator for economic in-
equality. If economic inequality is to remain (relatively)
legitimate in our society, democratic politics must retain
its integrity as a sphere of (relative) equality”).
10 Id.
11 My word, not theirs.
12 Id. at 14.
13 Id. at 9 (“We call this ‘voting with dollars’ because it
mimics two core attributes of the franchise: Citizens are
given equal voting power, but they must exercise this
power anonymously”).
14 Id.
15 Id. at 4.
tions? Thus, “[j]ust as [a voter] receives a bal-
lot on election day, he should also receive a spe-
cial credit card to finance his favorite candidate
as she makes her case to the electorate.”16 Vot-
ing with Dollars, terms this credit card the Pa-
triot card and it would be funded by Congress
with “Patriot dollars,” a form of public subsidy.
In practical terms, Ackerman and Ayres
would instruct Congress to deposit fifty Patriot
dollars in an account—the Patriot account—
designated by the voter.17 Only registered vot-
ers would be able to possess a Patriot account
and voters can contribute their Patriot dollars
to whomever they please, candidates, political
action committees (“PACs”), and interest
groups. It is worth noting that voters are not
limited to contributing Patriot dollars; under
the Ackerman-Ayres paradigm, voters can ex-
haust their personal accounts as well as their
Patriot account.18
Ackerman and Ayres do not impose many
limitations on the manner in which voters
may distribute their Patriot dollars, with two
exceptions. First, patriot dollars are inalien-
able—voters cannot sell their Patriot dollars
to the highest bidder. Second, the Patriot ac-
count is actually subdivided into three sepa-
rate subaccounts of 10, 15, and 25 dollars to
fund House, Senate, and Presidential races,
respectively.19
The second feature of the new paradigm is
the anonymity provision. Voting with Dollars
preserves the anonymity of the contributor via
a mechanism that the book refers to as the “se-
cret donation booth.” The secret donation
booth is a blind trust to be established by the
Federal Election Commission (FEC) that will
receive all campaign contributions.20 Once
again, the analogy to the ballot supplies the
blueprint for the function of the donation
booth. Just as voting is performed anony-
mously and voters cannot be accompanied into
the voting booth as they cast their ballots, they
cannot be accompanied to the ATM or to the
mailbox to contribute to their favorite political
entity.21 Campaign contributions, like voting,
should be a solitary and secret endeavor. The
blind trust cannot provide deposit receipts nor
can the trust provide a breakdown of individ-
ual contributions.22 The secret donation booth
is applicable only to campaign contributions
and does not cover non-coordinated issue-ori-
ented campaigns.23
Combining these two proposals—Patriot
dollars and anonymity—Ackerman and
Ayres promise that their new framework will
inject at least $5 billion of public money into
federal elections;24 engender a “citizenship ef-
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16 Id.
17 Id. at 14 (“Each American obtains a Patriot account in
her capacity as an equal citizen, and it is up to her to de-
cide how best to spend the new patriotic currency”).
18 Id. at 35.
19 Id. at 76. Subaccounts are also employed in presiden-
tial races when there is an incumbent president running
for reelection. Id. at 79.
20 Id. 96. The authors describe this device as follows:
We envision the Federal Election Commission estab-
lishing a blind trust that will receive all private con-
tributions to candidates and allied organizations.
Donors must follow one central commandment:
“Send your checks directly to the blind trust, and
don’t give them to anybody else.” Just as taxpayers
make check payable to the Internal Revenue Service,
donors will write theirs to the Political Contribution
Blind Trust without specifying their beneficiary more
precisely. The name of the favored candidate or or-
ganization will appear only on a separate form.
Id.
21 Id. at 96–8.
22 Id. at 96.
23 Id. at 97. An exception, however, is made for political
parties. All campaign expenditures by political parties are
to be made via the donation booth. Id. at 124–25. Acker-
man and Ayres do not define express and issue advocacy
specifically. Instead, they adopt a two-pronged approach
to regulating the line between express and issue advo-
cacy. They explore the possibility of (although not ex-
pressly advocating) expanding “major purpose organiza-
tion” status to non-party organizations. Id. at 125. In the
context of their proposal, PACs that receive patriotic
funds would have to use the donation booth to obtain pri-
vate funds. Id. Second, they would authorize the FEC to
“seek to capture ‘sham’ issue advocacy while excluding
non-political speech that innocuously refers to political is-
sues.” Id. at 288 & n.1; see also id. at 125. For two impor-
tant analyses of the constitutionality of the Ackerman and
Ayres initiative including the express/issue advocacy
problem see Daniel A. Farber, Dollars and Sense: A “New
Paradigm” for Campaign Finance Reform? (forthcoming Uni-
versity of Richmond Law Review) and Richard L. Hasen,
Vouchers and Buckley: The Need for “Regime Change” (forth-
coming University of Richmond Law Review).
24 Id. at 4, 14, 31, 51. The authors derive the $5 billion fig-
ure by assuming that the voters who voted in the 2000
elections also would “vote” with their Patriot dollars. See
id. at 83 (“To fix ideas, we have been imagining that Pa-
triot had been introduced in time for the 2000 elections,
and that the 100 million Americans who cast ballots had
also voted with their Patriots during the campaign. This
implies a yield of approximately 5 billion Patriots.”); see
also id. at 4.
fect” 25; and eliminate the role of big money
in democratic politics.26 Taken on its own
terms, the Ackerman-Ayres paradigm is fairly
attractive and intriguing. Moreover, the pro-
posal is sufficiently concrete and realistic that
it would be interesting to see it implemented,
particularly on a small scale.
IS PATRIOT SUFFICIENT?
However, before implementing the Acker-
man-Ayres campaign finance regime, we must
answer some initial questions. First, is the Ack-
erman and Ayres proposal adequate to finance
federal elections? This part argues that Acker-
man and Ayres may have overestimated the
amount that Patriot will contribute to cam-
paign finance.
An important preliminary question in the as-
sessment of any new campaign-financing
scheme, including Patriot, is how much public
money it will inject into federal campaigns.
This question is critical for at least two reasons.
First, the success of a public campaign-financ-
ing scheme depends in part upon its ability to
finance federal campaigns sufficiently. Second,
the authors believe that federal campaigns
should be financed primarily by public money.
Consequently, even though citizens may vote
with private dollars, Patriot must carry the load
of financing federal campaigns.
Notwithstanding the importance of this ques-
tion, a definitive answer is difficult if not im-
possible given current informational constraints.
As the authors note, in light of the fact that Pa-
triot depends upon citizen initiative, it is diffi-
cult to predict how many citizens will vote with
their Patriot dollars.27 The authors posit that if
“100 million Americans who came to the polls
in 2000 had also ‘voted’ with their patriot cards
during the campaign, their combined contribu-
tions would have amounted to $5 billion—over-
whelming the $3 billion provided by private
donors.”28 This $5 billion figure then serves as
an operating fact throughout the remainder of
the book: Patriot will contribute 5 billion dollars
to federal election campaigns.29
I do not object to $5 billion as an operating
figure—I understand the factual uncertainty
within which the authors are operating and
they deserve some leeway. However, Acker-
man and Ayres seem to present the 5 billion
dollars as a minimum of what we can expect
from Patriot. Thus, when Ackerman and Ayres
describe the “happier future,” of a world in
which Patriot is the predominant method of po-
litical participation, they remark:
Our initiative does not create a dismal
landscape of financial droughts and
swamps. Instead, it generates a wave of
enthusiastic citizen engagement—even
more Americans vote with their patriotic
dollars than go to the polls in November.
After all, there will be many more oppor-
tunities to show up at the voting station.
The result, say, is that 125 million citizens
give between $6 billion and $7 billion in
Patriots, overwhelming the billion or two
in private money flowing through the do-
nation booth.30
In contrast, to Ackerman and Ayres’s vision, I
view the 5 billion dollars estimate more as the
absolute maximum amount of public contribu-
tion we can expect in presidential years.
Given informational constraints, what is our
best estimate of the amount that citizens will
contribute with Patriot? What we are actually
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25 Id. at 15. Ackerman and Ayres define “citizenship ef-
fect” as the “millions of conversations and small decisions
surrounding patriotic expenditure . . . [that] provide[s] an
important new social context in which Americans . . . reaf-
firm their relationship as citizens, charged with the re-
sponsibility of steering the republic on a sound course.”
Id.
26 Id. at 25 (“By greatly reducing—if not entirely elimi-
nating—the special-interest dealing and gross inequalities
that scar the present reality, the new paradigm will en-
able Americans to create a culture of publicly responsible
private giving that is worthy in its own right.”); see also
id. at 9, 32.
27 Id. at 14.
28 Id. at 4–5; see also id. at 14 (“It is hard to guess how
many Americans will take advantage of their new patri-
otic opportunity. But as a thought experiment, suppose
that it is the same as the number of voters on election
day—this means 100 million Americans will contribute 5
billion Patriot dollars during the year when the presi-
dency is up for grabs.”).
29 See, e.g., id. at 31 (“With 5 billon Patriot dollars already
in the pool. . . .”); id. at 51 (“With citizens voting 5 billion
Patriot dollars . . .”).
30 Id. at 90–91.
looking for is Patriot turnout—the percentage
of eligible individuals who will allocate their
voucher dollars. In light of current factual un-
certainties, it is reasonable to assume, as Ack-
erman and Ayres do, that the probable uni-
verse of Patriot contributors is composed of
individuals who in fact vote.31 As the authors
note, in the 2000 federal elections approxi-
mately 100 million American turned out to
vote.32 Ackerman and Ayres by their own ad-
mission presume that everyone who voted
would also vote with patriot. This presumption
is as unreasonable as assuming that everyone
who is eligible to vote will vote. Notwith-
standing considerable appeal and expenditure
of resources by interested parties to get citizens
to vote, slightly more than half of all Ameri-
cans of voting age vote and slightly more than
two-thirds of all registered Americans vote in
presidential elections.
What is a better baseline? Perhaps a more re-
alistic baseline than that used by Ackerman
and Ayres is the percentage of voter turnout as a
parameter for predicting Patriot turnout—as op-
posed to using voter turnout as the equivalent
of Patriot turnout. Defining voter turnout as the
percentage of registered voters who cast a bal-
lot in the 2000 elections, sixty-eight percent of
the eligible population turned out to vote in
2000.33 If we define the eligible population for
Patriot as the voters who voted and we assume
that sixty-eight percent of them would vote
with Patriot, we would expect these voters to
contribute about $3.4 billion to federal cam-
paigns in the 2000 elections. Incidentally, this
amount is similar to the amount that Ackerman
and Ayres maintain that private parties con-
tributed—$3 billion—in the 2000 elections.34
Note that I selected registered voters over eli-
gible voters as my measure of turnout. The
turnout rate for registered voters is greater than
that for eligible voters (50% versus 66%). Thus,
if we use the 50% as our parameter, Patriot
might have contributed approximately $2.6 bil-
lion in the 2000 elections.
One may argue that these numbers are still
much too optimistic. At least two reasons
might support that argument. First, using Pa-
triot entails making some marginal effort be-
yond voting in the general election. If that is so,
using the number of people who vote in the
general election would not be a proper base-
line for determining Patriot turnout. What we
should look for is the number of people who
currently make some marginal effort beyond
the general election, such as those who turn out
in primaries.35 Turnout for primaries may be a
good benchmark because it reflects the type of
marginal effort beyond voting in the general
election that might be equivalent to using Pa-
triot. Moreover, it is reasonable to assume that
a voter who is not sufficiently interested or in-
formed to vote in the primary may be similarly
uninterested in using Patriot.
Figure 1 compares turnout in presidential
primaries with turnout in the general election
from 1968 to 2000.36 The relevant statistic is the
primary vote as a percentage of the general
election vote. As commentators have observed,
“only a fraction of those who participate in the
November general election participate in the
presidential nominating process.”37 It is true
that as the number of primaries has increased,
voter participation has increased correspond-
ingly. However, as Figure 1 demonstrates, the
total vote in the presidential primaries has
never reached 40 percent of the turnout for the
general election.
In the 2000 presidential elections 34% of the
voters who participated in the general election
participated in the presidential primaries. If the
voters who participated in the presidential pri-
maries also contributed with Patriot, their com-
bined contributions would have amounted to
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31 For example, though possible, it is unlikely that a citi-
zen would vote with Patriot but not for a candidate. Thus,
we would expect a fair amount of correlation between the
citizens who vote and those who also vote with Patriot.




34 ACKERMAN AND AYRES, supra note 1, at 5.
35 I am thankful to Dan Farber for raising this point and
making the suggestion.
36 The data for 1968–1996 presidential primaries and gen-
eral elections come from RHODES COOK, UNITED STATES
PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARY ELECTION 196–1996: A HANDBOOK OF
ELECTION STATISTICS 7 (2000). The data for the 2000 presi-
dential primary and general election come from the FEC’s
website at http://www.fec.gov/elections.html, last visited on
December 10, 2002.
37 COOK, supra note 36, at 7.
$1.8 billion. This is obviously a far cry from $5
billion.
There is also a second reason to be skeptical
of the claim that Patriot will inject millions of
new public dollars into campaign finance. Ack-
erman and Ayres’s proposal is based upon the
presupposition that voting and political contri-
butions are equivalent forms of political par-
ticipation: voting with dollars. However, citi-
zens may not share and may never come to
share that view. Perhaps for voters, voting is
the highest form of political participation—as
both a descriptive and normative matter.38
Consequently, one should not expect that vot-
ers will engage equally in both forms of polit-
ical participation. In other words, the incidence
of voting will always surpass contributions as
a form of political participation.
This point finds ample support by examining
Minnesota’s campaign financing scheme, which is
the most analogous comparison to Patriot extant.
The state of Minnesota employs a variant of a
voucher system for state elective offices. The state
will reimburse individual voters, up to $50, for
contributions to political parties and candidates
who agree to abide by certain spending limits.39
The state also subsidizes the political campaigns
of political parties and candidates provided that
they agree to certain spending limits.
Only 8% of Minnesotans took advantage of
the subsidy in the 2000 elections.40 In fact, as
Figure 2 demonstrates, the percentage of par-
ticipating taxpayers has consistently declined
for the last thirty years. Interestingly, though
participation in the subsidy program has de-
clined, turnout in Minnesota has not suffered
an equivalent fate. As Figure 3 shows, turnout
has dipped as low as 47% in 1986 and has
climbed as high as 71% in 1992.
To the extent that the Minnesota data are in-
dicative of the probable success of Patriot, the
situation looks grim. The disparity between
voter turnout and subsidized contributions
does not indicate the equivalence of these two
forms of political participation. That is, it is not
clear that voters view casting a ballot and fi-
nancial contributions as equivalent behavior.
Indeed, the opposite conclusion must be drawn
from the Minnesota data.
Additionally, the decline of voter participa-
tion may indicate that vouchers are not sus-
tainable as a long-term solution to campaign fi-
nance reform. As Ackerman and Ayres note,
perhaps the Minnesota program imposes too
many costs on voters to be useful as an accu-
rate predictor of the probable success of the Pa-
triot program.41 Ackerman and Ayres may be
right. Nevertheless, notwithstanding the avail-
ability of private financing and Ackerman and
Ayres’s stabilizing algorithm,42 it is necessary
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FIG. 1. Primary vote as percentage of general election
vote. Source: Rhodes Cook, United States Presidential Pri-
mary Elections, 1968–1996.
38 SIDNEY VERBA, KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN, HENRY E.
BRADY, VOICE AND EQUALITY: CIVIC VOLUNTARISM IN AMER-
ICAN POLITICS 9 (1995) (“Voting is the most common and,
in a profound sense, the most basic citizen act.”).
39 See MINN . STAT. § 290.06 subd. 23 (2002); MINN . STAT. §
10A.315 (2002); MINN. STAT. § 10A.322 (2002).
40 See http://www.cfboard.state.mn.us/.
41 ACKERMAN AND AYRES, supra note 1, at 262–63 & n.33
(noting that the Minnesota subsidy program “requires
contributors to take the trouble to obtain a special refund
form, file it with the state’s Department of Revenue, and
wait for reimbursement.”).
42 Ackerman and Ayres’s initiative would direct the FEC to
assure that total contributions (private and Patriot) do not
fall below a baseline so as to assure sufficient funding and
to assure that Patriot contributions are twice that of private
contributions. See id. at 223. In spite of these provisions, Ack-
erman and Ayres’s initiative depends upon a minimum
amount of broad citizen participation. Otherwise, as an-
other commentator has noted, “a small percentage of the
population is going to be controlling the flow of a lot of
public money. That would merely recreate the excess in-
fluence by small minorities that characterizes current cam-
paign finance.” Farber, supra note 23, at 19.
to better understand how much Patriot will
contribute to campaign finance before we im-
plement it on a wide-scale.
PROBLEMS WITH PATRIOT?
The second issue that Voting with Dollars
raises is whether the authors have sufficiently
identified the problems with campaign finance
that need reform. Reform can be directed at a
range of possible concerns and of course the ef-
fectiveness of the solution depends in great
part upon an accurate diagnosis of the prob-
lem.43 Assessing the probable effectiveness of
a proposed solution becomes an even more dif-
ficult task when the purpose of the reform is
ambiguous.
Voting with Dollars provides possibly four
motivations for reform: equality, quid pro quo
corruption, access, and big money. Voting with
Dollars presents these four different reasons for
campaign finance reform as one overarching
concern. Consequently, Voting with Dollars
does not sufficiently differentiate among these
four concerns and oscillates weakly among
them. On most occasions Voting with Dollars
presents “big money” as the problem.44 On
other occasions, the problem is “special ac-
cess.”45 Still on other occasions the authors
strongly imply that the problem is special in-
fluence or an illegal quid pro quo.46
It is not clear what Voting with Dollars refers
to when it uses the term “big money.” Some-
times the book seems to be concerned with the
fact that presumably wealthy citizens are able
to contribute large sums to political cam-
paigns.47 But sometimes the book seems to be
concerned with simple inequality in campaign
contributions: the fact that most citizens do not
contribute to campaign finance. Similarly, the
book is unclear when it refers to “special in-
fluence”48 or “special dealing.”49 At times, the
authors appear to be concerned with inequal-
ity in responsiveness: politicians are more re-
sponsive to the policy preferences of campaign
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FIG. 2. Percent of voters who participated in subsidy.
Source: Minnesota Campaign Finance and Public Disclo-
sure Board.
FIG. 3. Turnout by year. Source: Minnesota Secretary of
State.
43 David A. Strauss, What is the Goal of Campaign Finance
Reform?, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 141
44 Ackerman and Ayres, supra note 1, at 13 (“The prob-
lem requiring reform is the power of big money to un-
dermine free and equal democratic deliberation.”); id. at
14 (“Big money is the problem. . . .”)
45 Id. at 7.
46 Id. at 7; id. at 27; id. at 28. The corruption case is more
clearly made by Ayres elsewhere. See Ayres and Bulow,
supra note 5, at 842 (The corrupting influence of campaign
contributions has been a central concern of finance re-
form.”); see also id. at 838, 843.
47 ACKERMAN AND AYRES, supra note 1, at 44 (referring to
“big donors”).
48 See, e.g., id. at 118.
49 See, e.g., id. at 172.
contributors.50 At other times, the authors seem
to be concerned with influence peddling itself:
politicians are being bought.51 If there is a sus-
tained argument in the book with respect to the
problem of campaign finance, perhaps it is a
combination of those three concerns: wealthy
citizens are using campaign contributions to
buy political favors from politicians.52 How-
ever, one cannot ignore the authors’ contention
that enhancing the legitimacy of economic in-
equality in democratic politics is the “motivat-
ing factor” for reforming campaign finance.53
Each of these concerns is important in its
own right and each might serve as a justifica-
tion for reform. For example, one can easily jus-
tify the public finance aspect of the Ackerman-
Ayres system simply on the importance of
citizen involvement in all aspects of democra-
tic politics. Monetary contributions, coupled
with other aspects of political participation, are
important forms of civic engagement. To the
extent that money is even in part determina-
tive of the type of politics and policies that our
political process produces, citizens can feel a
sense of investment and dignity from their in-
volvement in helping to shape the outcomes of
democratic politics.
On the other hand, the anonymity prong is
sensible only if there is a paramount concern
with quid pro quo corruption. If the concern is
simply big money and its differential impact,
from the perspective of pluralism Patriot is less
of a safeguard and anonymity is ineffective.
That is, if one is concerned that those who con-
tribute are not a representative sample of the
voting population one may—and arguably
should—be concerned that the resultant poli-
cies may not represent the interests of the
greater polity or may differentially benefit the
interests of those who contribute. However,
anonymity is not responsive to such concerns.54
Indeed, by effectively removing contribution
limits55 and mandating anonymity, the Acker-
man and Ayres paradigm might increase the
payoff for contributions and firm up the rela-
tionship between contributions and outcomes.
Assume that you are a special interest entity or
a wealthy individual. You have policy prefer-
ences but the donation booth has made it im-
possible to promote your policy preferences by
asking for quid pro quo favors or special access.
In other words, the donation booth has made
it much more difficult to pursue what Profes-
sor Lowenstein terms a legislative strategy.56
For all intents and purposes, in order to pro-
mote those preferences you must help elect in-
dividuals who share those preferences. This is
what Professor Lowenstein refers to as the elec-
toral strategy.57 If pursuing a legislative strat-
egy is cost-prohibitive or simply unavaible,
electoral politics becomes a higher stakes game
because it may be the only game in town. Ad-
ditionally, the payoff may be greater because
one might be able to go a long way toward
achieving a desired policy objective simply by
pursuing an electoral strategy—electing indi-
viduals who are inclined to share those prefer-
ences.58 Thus, the combination of anonymity
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50 See, e.g., id. at 93–96.
51 See, e.g., id. at 154 (referencing a concern to vote-buy-
ing).
52 Id. at 51.
53 ACKERMAN AND AYRES, supra note 1, at 73.
54 One can argue that the donation booth could be justi-
fied even if the only policy goal is that of equality and not
corruption. Under a regime of forced anonymity, private
contributions (particularly big private contributions)
might dry up. This would reduce the variance at the high
end resulting in a more equal campaign finance system.
As I discuss infra, text accompanying notes 56 to 58, the
assumption that contributions might dry up depends
upon whether the contributor is pursuing an electoral or
a legislative strategy.
55 Voting with Dollars does impose some limitations on
contributions as regulations of last resort, but they are
much higher than those permitted by existing law. See id.
at 154–55.
56 Daniel Hays Lowenstein, On Campaign Finance Reform:
The Root of All Evil is Deeply Rooted, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV.
301, 308 (1989) (“Under the ‘legislative’ strategy, they
make contributions to whomever they think is likely to
be elected, in the hopes of influencing the likely winner
to pursue the favored policies by reasons of gratitude, a
desire to encourage future donations from the same or
additional groups, or similar motivations.”).
57 Id. (“Under the ‘electoral’ strategy, they [contributors]
make contributions to enhance the chances of victory of
candidates who are likely, if they are elected, to pursue
the policies the contributors favor.”)
58 See id. at 309. This argument may be another way of 
arguing, as Pam Karlan has done, that under the Acker-
man and Ayres paradigm “Patriot dollars and time-
honored votes [may] come to be seen as substantially 
interchangeable, [which] may have unfortunate citizen-
ship effects.” See Pamela S. Karlan, Elections and Change
Under “Voting with Dollars”, available at http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id5311085, last visited
December 3, 2002.
and extremely high contribution limits might
serve the dual perverse purposes of providing
an incentive for big donors to contribute dis-
proportionately and skew the political process
in favor of large contributors. Needless to say,
if the goals of campaign finance reform are to
limit the influence of big money or to increase
the confidence of citizens in the political pro-
cess, the anonymity prong of Voting with Dol-
lars might undermine these goals.
Further, the authors’ failure to define the
problem in campaign finance and differentiate
among multiple justifications for campaign fi-
nance reform precludes them from addressing
the fact there is differential empirical support
for each articulation of the problem in cam-
paign financing.59 Consider as an example the
proposition that moneyed interest—big money—
plays a distinctively large role in campaign fi-
nancing. In order to answer that question, one
must first define “big money.” If by “big
money” one means average PAC contributions
as against average individual contributions,
then one can conclude that a fair amount of
support exists in support of the proposition. In
a recent paper, Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo,
and Snyder determined that “the average con-
tribution from an individual to a candidate,
party committee or PAC . . . is approximately
$155.”60 In contrast, the “average PAC contri-
bution is $1,700;” corporations “give an aver-
age contribution of approximately $1,400 to
legislators; trade associations and membership
groups give average contributions of approxi-
mately $1,700, and labor unions give average
contributions of $2,200.”61
If, however, by big money one means total
PAC contributions as against total individual
contributions, then one will find much less ev-
idence in support of the proposition. An-
solabehere and his colleagues concluded that
of the 3 billion dollars that were spent in the
2000 elections, the majority of the money “came
from individuals in small amounts.”62 They es-
timated that “individuals contributed nearly
$2.4 billion, the public treasury paid $235 mil-
lion, and about $380 million came directly from
the treasuries of corporations, unions, and
other associations.”63 If the goal of Voting with
Dollars is to reduce the role of big money in pol-
itics, perhaps that goal has already been met if
big money is defined as money that does not
originate from individual contributors. If how-
ever, one defines big money as average contri-
butions, Voting with Dollars may achieve that
goal provided that individuals are induced to
use their Patriot dollars and less private money
enters the system.
MIXING METAPHORS AND THE
TROUBLE WITH EQUALITY
A central, if not the central, animating con-
cept in Voting with Dollars is the notion that the
campaign contribution is a method of political
participation that is like voting. The voting
metaphor serves as a blueprint for the pre-
scriptions outlined in the book. The idea that
campaign contributions are akin to voting cer-
tainly has normative intuitive appeal, but this
appeal is purchased at the price of a compelling
defense of what equality means in campaign fi-
nancing. Though I agree with the authors’ gen-
eral suggestion that democratic principles
ought to govern campaign finance reform,
equality and anonymity in campaign finance
can and must be defended on their own terms.
Voting with Dollars explicitly draws from the
intellectual and emotional appeal of the
Supreme Court’s one-person, one-vote cases.64
Just as the vote of each citizen counts equally,
so should their campaign contributions. As the
authors explain, it is not “enough to count
every vote equally on election day. The Amer-
ican citizen must be given a more equal say in
funding decisions.”65 As with many reformers,
equality concerns appear to be an important
source of motivation for Voting with Dollars.
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59 Compare e.g., FRANK J. SORAUF, MONEY IN AMERICAN
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tion of Bias in Congressional Committees, 84 AM. POL. REV.
794 (1990).
60 Stephen Ansolabehere, John de Figueredo, and James
M. Snyder, Why is There So Little Money in U.S. Politics?,
9. The paper is available at http://web.mit.edu/polisci/fac-
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61 Id. at 9.
62 Id. at 8
63 Id. at 8.
64 ACKERMAN AND AYRES, supra note 1, at 4, 14.
65 Id. at 4.
However, it is unclear what equality means in
campaign finance and what state of affairs
would satisfy that concern.
To get some leverage on this point, consider
Ackerman and Ayres’s treatment of what they
call patriotic PACs.66 One of the goals of Vot-
ing with Dollars is to “disrupt the special inter-
est dealing we now take for granted.”67 The
anonymity prong of the Ackerman and Ayres
paradigm is specifically designed to effectuate
that goal. All contributions are to be anony-
mous with one curious exception: patriotic con-
tributions to PACs and political parties are ex-
empt from the donation booth. Yet, if the goal
of campaign finance reformers is to reduce if
not eliminate the ability of moneyed interests
to buy access or influence, exempting PACs re-
quires a compelling defense. Assuming that the
goal of campaign finance reform is to decrease
the role of special interest money or even big
money, it would appear to follow that PACs,
patriotic or otherwise, are one of the best, if not
the best, candidates for application of manda-
tory anonymity rules. Yet, Ackerman and
Ayres disagree. As they explain:
When we make it hard for candidates to
identify contributions with certainty, we
make it hard for them to respond readily
to the influence of the underlying in-
equality of private resources. By disrupt-
ing potential quid pro quos, we enhance
the credibility of the claim that political
deliberation and decision is something
more than, and different from, the reflex-
ive servicing of economic privilege.
But this rationale does not apply where
Patriot dollars are concerned, for these re-
sources are distributed equally, reflecting
our status as equal citizens.68
When Ackerman and Ayres say that Patriot
dollars are distributed “equally,” they mean
that every voter receives the same amount 
of money—and, to the extent that a voter de-
cides to contribute, each voter contributes the
same amount to a particular PAC. Thus,
equality is defined very formally and satisfied
rather easily—too easily. By stipulation, all
patriotic contributions to PACs will be
“equal.”
Voting with Dollars’s justification for exempt-
ing patriotic PACs from the donation booth is
unsatisfying on a number of grounds. Two are
worth exploring here. First, Voting with Dollars’
definition of equality is much too narrow and
formalistic to satisfy the equality and legiti-
macy concerns that motivate reform. Acker-
man and Ayres believe that there is a relation-
ship between economic inequality and the
legitimacy of policy outcomes.69 Policy out-
comes are illegitimate to the extent that they
are the product of economic power. This rela-
tionship is mediated through the campaign fi-
nancing system. Campaign financing schemes
may undermine democratic legitimacy by “dis-
tort[ing] public deliberation in ways that are in-
consistent with our mutual recognition as equal
citizens.”70 Ackerman and Ayres solve the le-
gitimacy problem by purporting to interject
more equality: if political campaigns were fi-
nanced in a more “equal” manner, we would
legitimize economic inequality.
But how persuasive is this argument? Would
we really conclude that economic inequality is
no longer an issue—that economic inequality
is legitimate—because all voters receive the
same amount of money and among those who
contribute all voters contribute the same? Sup-
pose we enacted the campaign financing
scheme promulgated by Ackerman and Ayres
and later learned that officials are dispropor-
tionately responsive to voucher contributors as
against non-contributors?71 What if we also
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68 Id. at 73.
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that connection. The relationship between economic in-
equality and political power is a standard argument for
campaign finance reformers. See, e.g., Burt Neuborne, To-
ward a Democracy-Centered Reading of the First Amendment,
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skew the political agenda, and inappropriately affect po-
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70 ACKERMAN AND AYRES, supra note 1, at 13; see also id. at
73 (“The more big money shapes the direction of Ameri-
can politics, the less democratic politics can serve as a pri-
mary legitimator for economic inequality. If economic in-
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71 Cf. Strauss, supra note 43, at 143–49.
learned that contributions were in part a func-
tion of socio-economic status?72 Even with pub-
lic subsidization, those voters who were better
off and better educated were more likely to
vote with Patriot. Suppose further that African-
American voters were less likely to contribute
than white voters?73 Finally, what if socio-eco-
nomic status and race correlated with political
viewpoint? What then would be our conclusion
with respect to equality in the political process?
Once again, would we really conclude that re-
sultant economic inequalities are legitimate be-
cause we have achieved political equality?
Perhaps Ackerman and Ayres would define
their goal as equality of opportunity to influ-
ence the political process regardless of wealth.
But as a commentator remarked, “what good
is $50 voucher dollars (of which only $25 dol-
lars goes to the presidential campaign) when
the wealthy can give presidential candidates
$100,000?”74 In other words, are we satisfied
that we have achieved a measure of political
equality with Patriot? Is this what we intend by
political equality in campaign finance?
There is a second reason for questioning Vot-
ing with Dollars’s explanation for exempting pa-
triotic PACs from the anonymity requirement.
Economic inequality may be illegitimate irre-
spective of the existing campaign-financing
scheme. Consider the following reasoning from
Ackerman and Ayres:
If each citizen received the same number
of votes as he had dollars, a majority vote
in favor of a tax scheme that placed a
heavy burden on the poor would not serve
to legitimate the resulting distribution of
wealth. But when each citizen gets one
vote a majority vote in favor of a regres-
sive tax scheme may represent something
different—a judgment by the majority, af-
ter due deliberation, that the present dis-
tribution of wealth is too equal and that
the public good may be served by making
it more equal.75
Let us assume that all voters participate
equally in campaign financing—every eligible
voter contributes the exact same amount. Let
us then assume that the relevant legislature en-
acts a regressive tax scheme. Does the manner
in which elections are financed preclude us
from arguing that the resultant economic in-
equality is illegitimate? Equalizing participa-
tion may remove some reasons for believing
that certain viewpoints were not considered or
that legislators imposed costs on marginalized,
politically or otherwise, groups. But it would
not be determinative of the normative question:
is the resultant economic inequality just, fair,
or legitimate.
As Ackerman and Ayres recognize, eco-
nomic inequality is ubiquitous. Economic in-
equality is endemic to the political system and
systematically affects all aspects of the political
process. The concern with inequality, if it is to
be a meaningful enterprise, must extend be-
yond formal inequalities. Though, reformers
are right to be troubled by systemic inequali-
ties, if the legitimacy of policy outcomes de-
pends upon eliminating the effect of socio-eco-
nomic inequalities in campaign finance, we
might need to find a new mechanism for ad-
dressing the effect of market inequalities on
democratic deliberations.
Paradoxically, exempting patriotic PACs
from mandatory anonymity requirements, in-
stead of diminishing their importance, may in-
stitutionalize their indispensability as money
brokers. Under the Ackerman and Ayres
framework one can imagine a two-phased sys-
tem. In phase one the representative actively
solicits contributions for non-Patriotic money.
Given the high contribution limits that Voting
with Dollars favors,76 this phase will most likely
entail targeting contributors with the potential
of donating fairly large sums. If our represen-
tative is a rational actor seeking to efficiently
maximize a scarce resource, her time, she will
be personally involved in this phase of
fundraising. Phase two, in contrast, should in-
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72 Spencer Overton, Voices from the Past: Race, Privilege, and
Campaign Finance, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1541 (2001).
73 See, e.g., Spencer Overton, But Some Are More Equal:
Race, Exclusion, and Campaign Finance, 80 TEX. L. REV. 987
(2002); Terry Smith, Race and Money in Politics, 79 N.C. L.
REV. 1469 (2001).
74 Hasen, supra note 23, at 19.
75 ACKERMAN AND AYRES, supra note 1, at 13.
76 For example individuals can contribute up to $100,000
per year to candidates and political organizations. ACK-
ERMAN AND AYRES, supra note 1, at 154, 204.
volve the solicitation of Patriotic funds. By def-
inition, this task will involve soliciting small
sums of money. Again, supposing that our rep-
resentative is rational, we do not expect her to
be intimately involved in this phase of the
fundraising process. More than likely, some
political association will perform this task by
acting as a broker: we—the political associa-
tion—will collect Patriots and deliver them to
you—Member of Congress—if you behave. If
Patriotic contributions are important to our
representative or if she can behave at minimal
cost, we expect her to do so.
Ackerman and Ayres seem to anticipate this
problem and provide the following defense:
We do not generally condemn a politician
when he shapes his public views to gain
the support of a majority of his fellow cit-
izens on election day. By the same token,
we should not condemn him for heeding
the views of citizens when they are ex-
pressed through their contributions to pa-
triotic PACs. To the contrary, the active
and public involvement of patriotic PACs
is a sign of the vitality of the democratic
process.77
Perhaps. But the active involvement of pa-
triotic PACs may not be indicative of the active
involvement of the citizenry. Citizens may be
induced to remit their Patriot dollars to an is-
sue-oriented organization without initial
knowledge of the ultimate beneficiary. Thus,
Voting with Dollars may be correct that the ac-
tive involvement of patriotic PACs is indicative
of an active citizenry or it may be mistaken in
which case the active involvement of patriotic
PACs is a sign that moneyed interests have
found yet another loophole for exploiting cam-
paign finance rules to their own ends.78
Ackerman and Ayres are correct that some-
times the concern with inequality in campaign
finance is a concern with formal inequalities—
voters are not contributing the same amount.79
However, the problem is that inequality is not
an either/or proposition. Or put differently, we
should not speak of inequality but of inequal-
ities.80 A fitting comparison is the one-person
one-vote requirement of Gray v. Sanders,81
Westberry v. Sanders,82 and Reynolds v. Sims.83
As many scholars have argued, though one-
person, one-vote is an important measure of
political equality, it is not the only one.84 Per-
haps more importantly, blind adherence to a
formalistic and thin conception of political
equality precludes the possibility of develop-
ing a more robust and thick conception of po-
litical equality.85
Fundamentally, reformers must come to
terms with what they mean by political equal-
ity. Further, they must also come to terms with
how their favored campaign finance scheme
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78 Dan Farber has provided an interesting solution to this
problem. Using principles derived from property law,
Farber suggests subsidizing donors who contribute via
the donation booth. As he explains:
Indeed, the mere existence of this option might have
a strong effect on donors because it changes the na-
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credit to do so.” The public is then free to draw its
own conclusion about the donor’s motivation.
Daniel A. Farber, Afterword: Property and Free Speech, 93
NW. U. L. REV. 1239, 1258–59 (1999).
79 See, e.g., Foley, supra note 4.
80 Professor Herzog put the point very nicely: “The gram-
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MICH. L. REV. 1621, 1636 (2002); see also Guy-Uriel E.
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N.C. L. REV. 1103, 1155 (2002); Jonathan W. Still, Political
Equality and Election Systems, 91 ETHICS 375 (1981).
81 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
82 376 U.S. 1, 14 (1964).
83 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
84 See, e.g, Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Baker’s Promise, Equal
Protection, and the Modern Redistricting Revolution: A Plea
for Rationality, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1353 (2002); James Gard-
ner, One Person One Vote and the Possibility of Political Com-
munity, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1237 (2002); Heather Gerken, The
Costs and Causes of Minimalism in Voting Cases: Baker v.
Carr and its Progeny, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1411 (2002); Sanford
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ing, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1269 (2002).
85 See Charles, supra note 80; Gerken, supra note 84; Levin-
son, supra note 84; Heather K. Gerken, Understanding the
Right to an Undiluted Vote, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1663 (2001);
Sanford Levinson, Gerrymandering and the Brooding Om-
nipresence of Proportional Representation; Why Won’t It Go
Away?, 33 UCLA L. REV. 257 (1987).
satisfies the concern with political equality. I
suspect that, ultimately, the question will be
one of meaningful or substantial equality.86
Though Voting with Dollars significantly
moves the debate in a number of directions,  I
wish Ackerman and Ayres were more explicit
about how Voting with Dollars contributes to
our understanding of political equality in cam-
paign finance.
CONCLUSION
Even if we take into account some of the ar-
guments that this review raises, Voting with
Dollars remains an important book with new
contributions on a timely subject and should be
taken seriously. The proposal is well thought
out and fascinating. It is sufficiently concrete
that it can and should be implemented. Acker-
man and Ayres’s paradigm provides a fitting
alternative for judging past and current at-
tempts at campaign finance reform. 
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